Abstract. Rational secret sharing protocols in both the two-party and multi-party settings are proposed. These protocols are built in standard communication networks and with unconditional security. Namely, the protocols run over standard point-to-point networks without requiring physical assumptions or simultaneous channels, and even a computationally unbounded player cannot gain more than by deviating from the protocol. More precisely, for the 2-out-of-2 protocol the is a negligible function in the size of the secret, which is caused by the informationtheoretic MACs used for authentication. The t-out-of-n protocol is (t−1)-resilient and the is exponentially small in the number of participants. Although secret recovery cannot be guaranteed in this setting, a participant can at least reduce the Shannon entropy of the secret to less than 1 after the protocol. When the secret-domain is large, every rational player has great incentive to participate in the protocol.
Introduction
Secret sharing [2, 18] is an important tool in cryptography. The widely used tout-of-n scheme is that a dealer holding a secret distributes shares among n players such that any group of t or more players can recover the secret from their shares while any group of fewer than t players can not. In 2004 Halpern and Teague [8] studied the problem in a game theoretic sense and proposed rational secret sharing which is to fulfill the task among rational players who only act in their own self-interest. As Halpern and Teague pointed out that no rational player would broadcast his share in a deterministic recovering process, since keeping silence can guarantee him a utility that is equal to and sometimes even higher than the utilities of other players (because he might be the only one who gets the secret). Therefore most previous secret sharing schemes fail in the rational setting which requires to design a protocol such that all rational players have the incentive for participation. Furthermore, it is more desirable to design a protocol where no player has an incentive to deviate as long as the other players follow the protocol. This requirement is captured by the notion of -Nash equilibria only. But we will see that the " " is quite small and mostly acceptable.
Our Results and Main Ideas
We first design a 2-out-of-2 rational secret sharing protocol with unconditional security in standard communication networks. The main idea is distributing to player P 1 (resp. P 2 ) a list of length l 1 (resp. l 2 ) where l 2 ≤ l 1 ≤ l 2 + 1. Each cell of the lists contains a value, and all the values jointly determine the secret. The recovering phase consists of at most l 1 + 1 iterations. In each iteration, say, the j-th iteration, P 1 first broadcasts the value in his j-th cell, then P 2 does similarly. Since the two cases l 1 = l 2 + 1 and l 1 = l 2 both are possible, P 1 and P 2 cannot know which case really happens before the protocol ends. Therefore each player still has an incentive to broadcast the value even if it comes to his last cell. This protocol achieves an -Nash equilibrium, where is a negligible function in the size of the secret and is caused by the information-theoretic MACs used inside.
Then we build a t-out-of-n rational secret sharing protocol that is (t − 1)-resilient. Since in the information theoretic setting with non-simultaneous channels, a coalition of t−1 players can easily get the secret earlier than other players and leave the protocol early, we try to insure that the innocent players (i.e. players who follow the protocol) get as much information as possible. The main idea is to divide each cell into two parts where two values are stored respectively, and the two values are both possible to be the secret if the secret appears in this cell. In each iteration, players first broadcast the first part of the current cell in some order, then the second part. The index indicating whether the current value is the secret or not is to be revealed only after the next value has been recovered. More precisely, suppose the secret appears in the j-th cell which contains s , which is also a pleasant result when the secret-domain is large. On the other hand, the extra gain of the deviating coalition is at most , where is exponentially small in the number of participants in the recovering process. Table 1 displays comparisons in some aspects between our protocols in this paper and those in some previous work.
Related Work
Kol and Naor [10] provided constructions in both simultaneous and nonsimultaneous channels in the information theoretic setting. Our constructions are similar to theirs in that shares are both in the form of lists with different equilibrium channel coalition resilience security KN- [10] strict Nash simultaneous 1-resilient unconditional -Nash non-simultaneous 1-resilient unconditional ADGH- [1] -Nash simultaneous k-resilient computational/ unconditional FKN- [5] strict Nash non-simultaneous (t − 1)-resilient computational This paper -Nash non-simultaneous (t − 1)-resilient unconditional Table 1 .
length and the recovering is accomplished by revealing the lists cell by cell. But our 2-out-of-2 protocol is more efficient because shorter lists are involved and simpler cells are contained. Details will be found in the remarks after Theorem 1. General k-resilience was discussed in [1] where it achieved unconditional security for k < n 3 and computational security for k < n. But the protocols in [1] relied on simultaneous channels. Efficient protocols with optimal coalition resilience in standard communication networks were designed in [5] . Most importantly, it achieved equilibria with appealing properties, such as strict Nash, and stability with respect to trembles. But only computational security was guaranteed from the beginning of the recovering process.
Preliminaries
In this section it introduces notions about rational secret sharing and informationtheoretic MACs, as well as concepts of the equilibrium to be achieved in this work.
Secret Sharing and Players' Utilities
In a t-out-of-n secret sharing scheme, a dealer (denoted as Dealer hereafter) holding a secret distributes shares among n players such that the following two conditions are satisfied:
1. Recoverability. Any group of t or more players puting their shares together can uniquely determine the secret. 2. Secrecy. Any group of fewer than t players cannot recover the secret.
It usually assumes that Dealer is the trusted third party and each player is either honest or malicious. In a game theoretic view, it is more realistic to view each player as a rational party who acts only in his interest. To model rationality, we define for each player P i a real-valued utility function u i such that everyone's interest is to maximize his utility. The commonly used assumptions for defining utilities in rational secret sharing are as follows [8] :
-Each player always prefers to learn the secret than to not learn it; -Secondarily, each player prefers that the fewer of the other players who get it, the better.
In particular, we define four utility values for each player P i :
(1) u i = a if P i gets the secret while P j does not for any j = i; (2) u i = b if P i gets the secret and so does P j for some j = i; (3) u i = c if P i does not get the secret and neither does P j for any j = i; (4) u i = d if P i does not get the secret while P j does for some j = i.
From the common assumptions on utilities, it obviously holds that a > b > c > d.
Let S denote the secret-domain and |S| be the cardinality of S. Then by guessing the secret uniformly from S, a player at most gets the utility
To make every player has the incentive to participate in a protocol for secret recovering, it requires b > U random . Concerning about coalitions, for simplicity we additionally assume that -Once a player joins a coalition, he will never leave the coalition before the protocol ends; -Players in the same coalition always share all information they jointly have.
Given an execution of a protocol, let C(i) denote the coalition that P i joined in. Thus all players in C(i) have the same utility as P i . As an extension, we similarly define the four utility values a, b, c, d for each player P i as in (1)- (4) just replacing "j = i" with "j ∈ C(i)".
When no coalition is formed, namely, C(i) = {i} for any i ∈ {1, ..., n}, the problem is much easier [10] . In this work we deal with the most general coalitions in t-out-of n secret sharing, i.e. 1 ≤ |C(i)| ≤ t − 1.
Notions of Equilibria
In the recovering process of a secret sharing scheme, view the interaction between players as a game among the n players. Let σ = (σ 1 , ..., σ n ) denote a strategy profile of players, where σ i is P i 's strategy for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Usually, we let σ −i denote the strategy profile of all players except P i and σ C denote the strategy profile constricted to the coalition C ⊆ {1, ..., n}. Given a strategy profile σ, it induces the utility u i (σ) for each player P i . Referring to the definitions in [1, 5, 10, 11] , we give some notions of equilibria as follows: Definition 1. A strategy σ induces an -Nash equilibrium if for any player P i and any strategy σ i of P i , it holds that
When = 0 it is the well-known Nash equilibrium [16] . In some cases, a Nash equilibrium in the strict sense is hard to compute [3] , while computing theapproximate Nash equilibrium is much easier [4] . Therefore, the -Nash equilibrium is also an appealing notion for a small .
Definition 2.
A strategy σ induces an k-resilient -Nash equilibrium if for any coalition C of at most k players (i.e. |C| ≤ k) and for any strategy profile σ C of the coalition C, it holds that
where C denotes the complement of C.
When k = 1 it is the -Nash equilibrium just defined. In this work, we realize the resilience for k = t − 1 in a t-out-of-n secret sharing scheme. Obviously, this is the optimal coalition resilience in the t-out-of-n case.
Information-Theoretic MACs
We refer to [6] for the description of information theoretically secure message authentication codes (MACs). A message authentication code consists of three polynomial-time algorithms (Gen,Mac,Vrfy). The key-generation algorithm Gen takes as input the security parameter 1 m and outputs a key k. The message authentication algorithm Mac takes as input a key k and a message M ∈ {0, 1} ≤m , and outputs a tag t; we write this as t = Mac k (M ). The verification algorithm Vrfy takes as input a key k, a message M and a tag t, and outputs a bit b; i.e., b = Vrfy k (M, t). We regard b = 1 as acceptance and b = 0 as rejection, and require that for all m, all k output by Gen(1 m ), all M ∈ {0, 1} ≤m , it holds that Vrfy k (M, Mac k (M )) = 1.
Definition 3. (Gen,Mac,Vrfy) is an information-theoretic MAC if for any
, and for any (computationally unbounded) adversary A, the following probability is negligible in m:
For example, an information-theoretic MAC can be built as follows [17, 19] : Let F be a finite field, the key is (α, β) ∈ F 2 . For a message M ∈ F, the tag is generated as t = β − αM ∈ F.
3 Rational Secret Sharing: The 2-Out-of-2 Case
In this section we give a 2-out-of-2 rational secret sharing protocol in standard communication networks (i.e. point-to-point and non-simultaneous channel) and with unconditional security. Denote the protocol by Π, we describe Π in terms of Dealer's protocol and players' protocol separately. Actually, Dealer's protocol corresponds to the distributing phase, and players' protocol corresponds to the recovering phase where only players are active.
Let S = {0, 1} m be the secret-domain and s ∈ S be the secret. For player P 1 and P 2 , let a, b, c, d 
5. Send the list L 1 and the secret key β l1 (resp. the list L 2 and the secret key α l2+1 ) to P 1 (resp. P 2 ). j−1 (Note for j = 1 this check is not needed). If it holds, then P 1 sends (a j , Mac αj (a j )) to P 2 ; otherwise, P 1 quits and outputs (⊕
Denote by (a j , t (a)
j ) the message that P 2 received from P 1 in last round. Player P 2 checks if it holds Mac αj (a j ) = t (a) j . If it holds, P 2 sends (b j , Mac βj (b j )) to P 1 ; otherwise, P 2 quits and outputs (⊕
If a player's list comes to the end, i.e., the j-th cell of his list is empty, then after verifying the message just received from the opposite, he sends the message "end" in the j-th iteration. After that both players stop running and set the secret to be the XOR of all the values revealed so far.
In brief, the recovering process is accomplished by letting the two players alternately reveal their lists cell by cell, while P 1 goes first. Figure 1 describes the recovering process when l 1 = l 2 .
Then we give some intuition as to why the recovering process of Π (i.e. players' protocol) is an -Nash equilibrium for an appropriate choice of p, where = (m) is a negligible function in length of the secret. Fig. 1 . The recovering process when l1 = l2.
(a) P 1 has no incentive to deviate in the first iteration.
Since l 1 +l 2 = l+1 > 1, it must have l 2 ≥ 1. Namely, P 2 at least holds a value that contributes to determining s. P 1 cannot get this value if his message broadcast in the first iteration does not pass verification of the MAC. So by deviating, P 1 can get utility at most µ(m)a+ (1−µ(m) )U random , where µ(m) is the probability of successfully forging an MAC as defined in Definition 3 and
is an upperbound of the utility that a player can get by guessing the secret uniformly from S. By requiring
P 1 has no incentive to deviate in this iteration. (b) For 2 ≤ j ≤ l 1 , P 1 has no incentive to deviate in the j-th iteration.
Similarly to the analysis in (a), P 1 has no incentive to deviate through iteration 2 to l 1 − 1. Achieving the l 1 -th iteration, with probability p it holds that l 2 = l 1 − 1, i.e. P 2 's list has run out. In this situation, P 1 can get utility at most a by deviation. But if l 2 = l 1 which happens with probability 1 − p, P 1 get at most µ(m)a + (1 − µ(m))U random . Therefore P 1 will not deviate by requiring
Note that inequality (2) implies inequality (1). (c) For 1 ≤ j ≤ l 2 , P 2 has no incentive to deviate in the j-th iteration.
The analysis is similar to that of (b). (d) P 1 (resp. P 2 ) cannot increase his utility more than by deviating in the (l 1 + 1)-th (resp. the (l 2 + 1)-th) iteration. In the (l 1 + 1)-th iteration and after verifying the MAC, P 1 already knows that l 2 = l 1 and he can determine
But P 2 still does not know whether P 1 's list is longer than his or not. P 1 can deceive P 2 by continuing to send a fake value in the (l 1 + 1)-th iteration which passes verification of the MAC under the secret key α l1+1 = α l2+1 , and the success probability is at most µ(m) due to security of the MAC. Thus P 1 can get utility at most µ(m)a + (1 − µ(m) )b. Therefore,
The analysis of P 2 's (l 2 + 1)-th iteration is similar.
From the analysis (a)-(d), it immediately has the following theorem. Theorem 1. If the parameter p satisfies the inequality (2) , then the protocol Π for 2-out-of-2 rational secret sharing induces an -Nash equilibrium with = µ (m)(a − b), where µ(m) is the negligible probability of successfully forging an information-theoretic MAC. Remark 1. The 2-out-of-2 protocol in [10] . That is, we only need the list that is almost half as long as the shorter list in [10] , which means the expected size of shares in our protocol is smaller.
Remark 2. Since in [10] the shorter list was just a prefix of the longer one and every value alone could possibly be the secret, a player can certainly determine the secret if he finds all his remain cells contain the same value. To fix this problem, it masked each value by a random number for each cell. Thus the cells in [10] contained both the masked value and share of the mask. But in our protocol, the secret is jointly determined by all values contained in the two lists, a player cannot determine the secret even if he sees all values in his list. Therefor no mask is needed in our protocol and our lists consist of simpler cells.
Rational Secret Sharing: The t-Out-of-n Case
We now construct a t-out-of-n rational secret sharing protocol in the information theoretic setting. Since it is in non-simultaneous channels and (t − 1)-resilience is required, the protocol is not a simple extension of the protocol Π constructed in Section 3. Denote the t-out-of-n protocol by Π . We still describe Π in terms of Dealer's protocol and players' protocol separately.
Dealer's Protocol. 1. Choose integers l * and d according to a geometric distribution with parameter p , where p is a constant to be determined later (in Theorem 2).
2. Randomly select σ ∈ {0, 1} such that Prob[σ = 0] = q, where q is a constant to be determined later (in Theorem 2).
3. Construct a list of length l = l * + d. For 1 ≤ j ≤ l, the j-th cell contains:
where S is the secret-domain. In particular, it requires s σ l * = s and the other values are randomly chosen. Now we give some analysis to explain why the recovering process of Π induces an -Nash equilibrium with (t − 1)-resilience. For simplicity, we neglect the negligible part of caused by successfully forging the MAC. As a warm-up, we first show that any single player has no incentive to deviate from the protocol. For a single player P i , there are two cases: (a) P i holds a list of length l.
It is important to note that P i cannot know he is holding the long list until the protocol ends or it comes to his last cell (i.e. the l-th cell). Therefore, for 1 ≤ j < l, P i guesses l * = j and deviates in the j-th iteration, then he can get utility at most p a + (1 − p )U random . P i has no incentive to deviate if it holds p a + (1 − p )U random < b .
When it comes to the last cell (i.e. the l-th cell) and P i is not the first one to send messages according to π l−1 , then P i knows that l * = l − 1 and s = s 1 l−1 . Actually, every other player can also conclude s = s 1 l−1 no matter what P i does in the l-th iteration. Thus P i has no incentive to deviate. (b) P i holds a list of length l * . Similarly, it can see that P i has no incentive to deviate in the j-th iteration for 1 ≤ j ≤ l * − 1, if the inequality (3) holds. When it comes to the l * -th iteration P i knows he is holding the short list because he is the first to send messages in that iteration. Since P i is the first one to talk in the l * -th iteration, when P i determines for sure what the secret is, so do the other players. Thus P i has no incentive to deviate.
In the information theoretic setting of rational secret sharing, only approximate Nash equilibrium can be achieved in standard communication networks. We realize -Nash both for the 2-out-of-2 case and the t-out-of-n case. The 2-out-of-2 protocol is more efficient than previous ones and the is a negligible function in the size of the secret. This negligible function is due to the informationtheoretic MAC used inside. The t-out-of-n protocol is (t − 1)-resilient and the is exponentially small in the number of participants. We leave it as an open problem to determine the lower bound of in both cases.
